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Whether the American public is aware of it or not, they are
increasingly governed directly by appointed agencies, boards and commissions. This is especially true of those who deal in one way or
another with the public domain, and consequently with the United
States Department of Interior. In this article, the authors examine the
methods by which a party adversely affected by an Interior Department
ruling might obtain judicial review of that decision.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS UNDER THE MINERAL
LEASING ACT OF 1920
James E. Sperling*
John R. Cooney"
PART I
GENERAL BACKGROUND

U

NDER the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and its amendments,' the Secretary of the Interior is charged with the
responsibility of administrating the leasing for mineral development of lands in the public domain. Since so much of the
land area of the Western United States comprises Federal
lands, it is not surprising that actions and decisions of the
Secretary of the Interior, particularly with reference to the
leasing of Federal lands for oil and gas development, should
often have a far reaching effect. It is a tribute to the SecreModrall, Seymour, Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Albuquerque, New
Mexico; B.A. 1938, LL.B. 1941, Washburn University, Topeka, Kansas;
Member of the Kansas and New Mexico Bars. Mr. Sperling is the representative of the Governor of New Mexico to the Public Land Law Review
Commission.
** Associate, Modrall, Seymour, Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, B.A., LL.B. 1965, University of New Mexico; Member of the New
Mexico Bar. Mr. Cooney was Chairman of the Board of Editors, Natural
Resources Journal, 1964-65.
1. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437 (1920), as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181287 (1964).
*Partner,
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tary and to the many dedicated employees of the Department
of Interior and the Bureau of Land Management that the administration of the Mineral Leasing Act infrequently results
in litigation. However, as the Secretary is often compelled under his statutory grant of authority to render administrative
determinations which are adverse to persons holding or expecting to acquire rights in known or prospective mineral deposits,
it is not uncommon for the person adversely affected by such
a determination to wish to test the correctness of the Secretary's action (or non-action) in court. The purpose of this
article is to set forth, in what must necessarily be a broad
outline, the various modes of judicial review of the Secretary's
decision which are open to such a dissatisfied person. In
addition, there will be an attempt at analysis of the situations
in which the different modes of review appear to be the most
proper. It is hoped that this article will furnish the general
practitioner with at least an idea of the problems he faces
in seeking review of an adverse decision by the Secretary of
the Interior. Although modern rules of pleading and their
liberal construction have eliminated many a trap for the
unwary litigant, the doctrines of sovereign immunity and
indispensable parties and the application of rules of jurisdiction and venue in actions between private individuals and
a United States agency or officer thereof raise enough problems to require caution.
Space does not permit an examination of the various
actions or decisions adverse to a claimant or lessee which
might be made by the Secretary of the Interior or his delegate
under the Mineral Leasing Act.2
The 'doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
requires that administrative action be completed before courts
will undertake to review decisions of the administrator.8 In
general, the action or failure to act which aggrieves the party
wishing to appeal will at first involve the manager of the
2.

For a general outline of the scope of the Mineral Leasing Act and procedures thereunder, see Barnhill, The Mineral Leasing Act; A Guide, 33
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 267 (1961). For more exhaustive treatments, see
HOFFMAN, OIL AND GAS LEASING ON FEDERAL LANDS (1957); ROCKY MOUNLAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS
TAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION,

LEASES (1964).
3. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
ADMImsTRATrVE LAw TEXT § 20.01-.10 (1959).
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local land office of the Bureau of Land Management. In such
a case, the first appellate step in the administrative process
is an appeal to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management.' The rules regulating such appeals are straightforward
and are generally furnished to the parties involved along with
the decision appealed from, and perhaps the only requirement
that need be noted here is that the appeal must be taken by
filing a notice of appeal within 30 days in the office of the
officer who made the decision appealed from.5 Assuming an
adverse decision from the Director of the Bureau of Land
Management, the next step in the administrative process is an
appeal to the Secretary of the Interior.' Again, the rules
regulating appeals from the Director to the Secretary are
reasonable and are generally furnished to the adverse party
along with the decision of the Director. The 30-day time limit
for appeals applies to appeals to the Secretary One provision
of the rules governing appeals at both levels which should not
be overlooked is that the appeal will be subject to summary
dismissal if a statement of reasons for the appeal is not
filed with the notice of appeal or within 30 days thereafter.8
Now let us assume that the client has been served with
a decision of the Secretary of the Interior, following an appeal to the Secretary from the Director, which upholds the
action complained of or refuses to perform the acts sought.
The client desires judicial review of the administrative decision. The client's lawyer immediately is faced with the following problems: (1) What is the proper venue? (2) What
form should the action take? (3) What statutes govern jurisdiction? (4) Who must be named as parties-defendant? (5)
How must service be obtained upon the defendants?
In order to lay the background for a discussion of the
proper means of securing judicial review of administrative
determinations by the Secretary of the Interior under the
Mineral Leasing Act, it is first necessary to review in general
4. For rules governing appeals to the Director, see 43 C.F.R. §§ 1842.2 -. 5-8
(1965).

5. 43 C.F.R. § 1842.4(a) (1965).
6. For rules governing appeals from the Director to the Secretary of the
Interior, see 43 C.F.R. §§ 1844.1 -.9 (1965).
7. 43 C.F.R. § 1844.2 (1965).
8. 48 C.F.R. §§ 1840.0-7, 1842.5-1, 1844.3 (1965).
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terms the doctrines of sovereign imnunity and indispensable
parties as they relate to actions against government officials
or agencies, and also to trace briefly the historical rules relating to availability of mandamus relief outside the District
of Columbia.
A. Sovereign Immunity
The familiar although shadowy doctrine of sovereign
immunity declares that the United States may not be sued
without its consent.9 Where the statutes governing and establishing administrative agencies make no specific provision
for judicial review, the action for review should be brought
against the officer performing or refusing to perform the
action complained of in order to forestall a plea of sovereign
immunity. The general theory is that the official who acts
outside his statutory authority, misinterprets his authority,
or acts pursuant to an invalid statute, is not entitled to
rely upon the government's immunity from suit. ° It is
recognized that if the action and the relief sought thereunder
is in reality a suit against the government, then the employment of the fiction of naming an individual as defendant
should not be resorted to or allowed. Examples of such suits
would include those which seek to compel specific performance
of contracts entered into by the government," to force the
payment of Suns of money out of public funds" or to secure
the possession of government property. 1'
As recently as 1964, it was declared that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity arose infrequently in litigation with the
Secretary or the Bureau of Land Management. 4 However,
an analysis of the holding of the Supreme Court in Larson
5 the leading case
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,"
expouding the doctrine of sovereign immunity, demonstrates
that the government might be expected to raise the doctrine
9. See United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846).
10. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See James, Indispensability of Government or of Superior Officer in Actions to Review Administrative Determinations, 10 How. L.J. 22 (1964).
11. See Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918).
12. See Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945).
13. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 737-38 (1947).
14. See Peck, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions of Bureau of Land
Management and Secretary of the Interior, 9 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 225,

252 (1964).
15. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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as a defense in suits brought to review administrative actions
of the Secretary of the Interior. In the Larson case, the
plaintiff had contracted with the War Assets Administration
to buy some coal under a contract which the Administration
interpreted as requiring a deposit. A letter of credit was
offered in place of the deposit, and the War Assets Administration thereupon negotiated for sale of the coal to another.
The plaintiff sued for an injunction prohibiting the sale of
the coal to another party and a declaratory judgment that
he owned the coal and the sale to the second party was invalid.
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the suit, stating its holding as follows:
We hold that if the actions of an officer do
not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory
authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign,
whether or not they are tortious under general law,
if they would be regarded as the actions of a private
principal under the normal rules of agency. 6
The doctrine thus enunciated, despite the language of
some courts to the contrary, 7 still continues to be very much
a part of the Federal law applicable to review of administrative action."8
16. Id. at 695.
17. In Smith v. Katzenbach, 351 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court held that
the doctrine did not prevent a suit against an official threatening to act
unconstitutionally, even though the threatened action is of a type which
can only be taken by a federal official. While this ruling may not in fact
conflict with the rule laid down in Larson, the court in the Smith case,
in the course of its opinion, stated with reference to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity:
There are some gasps of vitality left in this fading doctrine
of sovereign immunity-notably in cases involving government
property ....
But it is lifeless when offered as a defense barring
examination of a plea that action threatened by an executive
official transcends constitutional limitations ....
....
The doctrine whereby a court denies jurisdiction to entertain a suit upon the basis of a consideration of its merits seems
to be an accepted feature of this field of law . . . though one
rooted in paradox ....
351 F.2d at 813-14.
18. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963).
In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), riparian and overlying owners
sought to enjoin officials of the Bureau of Reclamation from impounding
water at a federal dam on the San Joaquin River, alleging that such impounding contravened the plaintiffs' rights to beneficial use of the waters
of the river below the dam. The United States was joined as a party
defendant. The Supreme Court held that the government, through its
officials, had the statutory power to impound the water and that such
seizure was constitutionally permissible. Therefore, even though the action
of the officials could be characterized as a "trespass," the injunction would

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1966

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 1 [1966], Iss. 2, Art. 3

LAND AND WATER LAW REVEW

Vol. I

At least on the surface, it would appear that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity thus applied would bar a suit for
judicial review of the action of the Secretary of Interior
wherein it is alleged merely that the Secretary while acting
within his valid statutory authority misconstrued a statute
or made an erroneous determination of fact. However, if
the Secretary has in fact misconstrued a statute, his action
taken pursuant to his erroneous construction of the terms of
the authority granted him by the statute necessarily exceeds
the terms of his statutory authority, for if they did not, his
construction of the statute could not be erroneous. By the
same token, if his decision is based upon an erroneous determination of fact, or a determination of fact which cannot be
supported by substantial evidence, and the existence of that
fact is essential to his exercise of authority under the statute,
then he has either exceeded or failed to exercise the authority
and duties conferred upon him by the statute. Furthermore,
the Administrative Procedure Act provides: "Any person
suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the mean"interfere with the public administration" and would also "expend itself
on the public treasury," since the physical solution required the construction,
by the government, of ten small dams along the stretch of river involved for
the purpose of keeping the water at a level equivalent to the natural flow.
Under the doctrine of the Larson case, the court held that sovereign immunity barred the suit but that the plaintiffs would be entitled to damages for
the interference or taking "in an appropriate proceeding."
In Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962), the plaintiffs filed a
common law action of ejectment against a Forest Service officer of the
Department of Agriculture, alleging that the defendant occupied certain
land which rightfully belonged to the plaintiffs. It was not alleged that
the possession was unconstitutional, nor was it alleged that the officer was
acting beyond his delegated statutory powers. The plaintiffs' claim was
based on the fact that the title of the United States derived from a conveyance in fee by a life tenant and that the plaintiffs were the remaindermen of the life estate. Under the Larson doctrine, the Supreme Court held
that the suit was rightly dismissed "as an action which in substance and
effect was one against the United States without its consent." Id. at 648.
See also Ward v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 321 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1963),
in which the plaintiff brought suit to quiet title and to cancel as a cloud
upon title an oil and gas lease executed by the Bureau of Land Management.
The suit was brought against the Secretary of the Interior and the Director
of the Bureau as well as against the lessees. The dispute centered around
the question of whether a valid patent had been issued from the United
States on the land in question or whether the tract remained public land.
The court held that the official defendants had acted within their statutory
powers and their actions were not constitutionally void, and that the suit
was in reality one against the United States to which it had not consented
declaring that the suit was one in essence against a sovereign and could
not be "tried behind its back." The court ruled that the complaint should
be dismissed as to all parties. See also Mitchell v. McNamara, 352 F.2d 700
(D. C. Cir. 1965).
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ing of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof. " 9
Recent decisions have held that this provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act constitutes a waiver of the
defense of sovereign immunity in actions to which the Act
applies.20 However, even though it is concluded that the
Administrative Procedure Act applies and that the particular
action is not barred by sovereign immunity, the action should
19. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
20. In Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958), a local official of the
Bureau of Land Management entered an order denying the plaintiff's application for patents to certain mining claims and cancelling his mineral entries
thereon. The order was affirmed, following appeals, by both the Director
of the Bureau and the Secretary. Suit was brought against the local officers
of the Bureau of Land Management to secure review of the order. The
district court dismissed the action holding, inter alia, that " 'the action, in
effect, is an action against the government of the United States and the
government has not consented to be sued.' " 271 F.2d at 32. In reversing,
the Ninth Circuit stated:
We have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
Administrative Procedure Act is applicable here both in respect to
the agency's procedure and to the right to judicial review ....
Furthermore, it seems plain that under § 10 of the Act appellant was entitled to judicial review of the order here involved.
That section provides (subject to certain exceptions presently to
be noticed by us) that "any person suffering legal wrong because
of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such
action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled
to judicial review thereof." The only exceptions are those stated
in the first sentence of the section which excepts from this review
orders where statutes preclude judicial review, or where "agency
action is by law committed to agency discretion." The first exception is not applicable for no statute precludes judicial review here.
Appellees contend that the second section applies,--that in this
case the agency action was "by law committed to agency discretion."
Of course the officers of the Bureau of Land Management such
as the appellee, Witmer, and those authorized within the Department to review this action, are authorized and required to exercise
discretion in passing upon applications for patents to mining claims
or upon contests with respect thereto. But this does not preclude
judicial review within the meaning of the exception here involved .... The exercise of discretion by the agency does not in itself
negative the right to judicial review.
Id. at 32-33.
In McEachern v. United States, 321 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1963), the plaintiff was removed from office as a hearing examiner for the Social Security
Administration. He thereupon sought review and vacation of the order in
the district court, but the suit was dismissed on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Civil Service Commission.
On appeal, this decision was reversed in part and affirmed in part, the
court directing the lower court to allow the plaintiff to amend so as to
drop the United States as a party defendant and to implead proper defendants, namely, the members of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner of Social Security. The court held that the plaintiff had been appointed as a hearing examiner under 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1964), a part of
the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the Act in § 5 [5 U.S.C. § 1004
(1964)], in excepting from review the selection or tenure of an officer or
employee of the United States, expressly excepted from the exception
"examiners appointed pursuant to Section 1010 of this title." The court
held that the selection or tenure of an examiner was therefore reviewable
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be brought against the individual officers whose action is
sought to be reviewed rather than against the agency or the
United States.2 '
under the Act. The court then held that venue of the action could be laid
in the District of the plaintiff's residence by virtue of the 1962 Amendment
to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e), and that the same Amendment permitted the officers
of the United States or its agency to be sued there.
In Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1961), the court
ruled: "The [Administrative Procedure] Act . . . makes a clear waiver of
sovereign immunity in actions to which it applies."
These recent decisions recognizing that the Administrative Procedure
Act, where applicable, was intended to waive the defense of sovereign immunity, while unquestionably stating what was probably the purpose of the
Act, may conflict with certain earlier decisions in which it was held that
the Act was not to be construed as an implied waiver of sovereign immunity
in all suits against the government. See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512
(1952); Arizona ex rel. Arizona Bd. of Public Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F.2d
498 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
21. For an example of the problems which might be raised when a party seeking
review of an administrative action simply files suit directly against the
United States, see Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964).
The plaintiffs were original locators of placer mining claims. The Department of Interior through administrative proceedings found that there had
been no valid discovery of minerals on the claims and declared them to
be invalid and of no effect. Without appealing the order within the administrative process (i.e., first to the Director and then to the Secretary), the
plaintiffs sued the United States seeking review of the order. The action
was promptly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the dismissal was
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. In an opinion which repeated the Larson
rule of sovereign immunity and at the same time seemed to recognize that
sovereign immunity would be no bar to the suit if proper defendants were
sued and administrative remedies exhausted, the court said:
The Bureau of Land Management and the United States
of the Interior are not suable entities, they are
Department
administrative agencies of the United States, which has not consented to be sued . . . . There is no allegation or contention that
the defendant Nielson acted beyond the scope of his authority. He
is a local subordinate of the Secretary of the Interior, and without
authority to take any affirmative action which could grant relief
to the appellants.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C., §§ 1001 et seq.,
does not purport to give consent to suits against the United States.
The Act provides that the person suffering legal wrong because
of any agency action, or who is adversely affected or aggravated
by such action, shall be entitled to judicial review. This review
may be obtained only by an appropriate action in "any court of
competent jurisdiction." Such an action may not be maintained
if the court lacks jurisdiction upon any ground . . . . In Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 83 S.Ct. 379, 9 L.Ed.2d
350, the court discussed the nature of the rights of locators to
mining claims which had not gone to patent, and stated that controversies over such claims "should be solved by appeal to the
land department, and not to the courts." In a footnote (footnote
7, p. 338, 83 S.Ct., p. 383), the court stated that "Claimants today
may appeal the Examiner's decision to the Director of the Bureau
(43 C.F.R., 1962, Supp., § 221.1), from him to the Secretary (id.,
§ 221.31), and from there to the courts. Foster v. Seaton [106 U.S.
App. D.C. 253], 271 F.2d 836." Apparently the Supreme Court
approves the procedure in Foster v. Seaton, supra, which was a
suit against the Secretary of the Interior and not the United
States. See McEachern v. United States, 4 Cir., 321 F.2d 31.
335 F.2d at 918-19.
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B. Indispensability of the Secretary of Interior
In actions for review of an administrative decision under
the Mineral Leasing Act brought against a local official in
districts outside the District of Colmnbia, government lawyers have frequently asserted the defense that the Secretary
of the Interior is an indispensable party and since the district
court lacks jurisdiction over the person of the Secretary, the
action is required to be dismissed. 2 The doctrine of the indispensable superior official was stated as follows in the
leading case of Williams v. Fanning:"[T] he superior officer
is an indispensable party if the decree granting the relief
sought will require him to take action, either by exercising
directly a power lodged in him or by having a subordinate
exercise it for him." 2 3 The doctrine in its application to actions brought against the Secretary of the Interior has led
to the conclusion that the Secretary is an indispensable party
in actions to compel the issuance of a patent 4 or a lease,2 5 but
is not an indispensable party where the relief sought is an
22. See, e.g., Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th
Cir. 1960); Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 588 (D. Colo. 1956),
aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1956).
23. Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490, 493 (1947). The doctrine of Williams
was apparently relaxed in 1955 in the case of Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro,
349 U.S. 48 (1955), in which the court held that the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization was not an indispensable party to a suit
brought by an alien to challenge a deportation order since "otherwise in
order to try his case an alien might be compelled to go to the District of
Columbia to obtain jurisdiction over the Commissioner. To impose this burden
on an alien about to be deported would be completely inconsistent with the
basic policy of the Administrative Procedure Act to facilitate court review
of such administrative action. We know of no necessity for such a harsh
rule." Id. at 53. However, in Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U.S. 599 (1957),
the issue was whether superior officers must be joined in a suit for declaration that the petitioner was eligible for suspension of deportation and to
enjoin the District Director from taking him into custody. The Supreme
Court in Ceballos repeated the early formal language of the Williams test
and stated that in Pedreiro it had held that the question of indispensability
is dependent on the ability and authority of the defendant before the court
to effectuate the relief which the alien seeks. The commentators have
generally recognized that the Ceballos case represents a return to the
Williams test and an apparent disapproval of the relaxation of that test
which had occurred in Pedreiro. See DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TExT
§ 27.08 (1959), wherein Professor Davis, in discussing the effect of the
Ceballos case on the Pedreirocase likened the Supreme Court to "the mother
mink who eats her young;" James, Indispensability of Government or of
Superior Officer in Actions to Review Administrative Decisions, 10 How.
L.J. 22, 29-32 (1964).
24. Thomas v. Union Pac. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 588 (D.Colo. 1956), aff'd per
curiam, 239 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1956).
25. Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897).
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injunction restraining the administrative cancellation of a
lease.2 6
The problem of deciding whether to sue the Secretary in
the District of Columbia, or the district officer in the district
of the plaintiff's residence, which previously required the
party seeking review to chart a course through the rather
confusing decisions defining the doctrine of the indispensable
superior officer," have been eliminated by the 1962 amendment to the venue statute which provides as follows:
(e) A civil action in which each 'defendant is
an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof acting in his official capacity or
under color of legal authority, or an agency of the
United States, may, except as otherwise provided
by law, be brought in any judicial district in which:
(1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause
of action arose, or (3) any real property involved
in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides
if no real property is involved in the action.
The summons and complaint in such action shall
be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure except that the delivery of the summons
and complaint to the officer or agency as required
by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond
the territorial limits of the district in which the
action is brought. 8
There can be little doubt but that the amendment was intended
to alleviate the situation faced by the plaintiff who sought
review of an action affecting mineral or water rights, 9 and
26. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Pierson, 284 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 936 (1961). See also Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29
(9th Cir. 1958).
27. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 27.08 (1959):
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action taken
through a local officer will usually sue the officer in order to
escape the doctrine of sovereign immunity. May he sue the local
officer, or must he go to the District of Columbia and sue the
superior officer? Only slight exaggeration is involved in the statement that nine Supreme Court decisions provide nine solutions.
28. 76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964).
29. See S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962):
However, disregarding considerations of convenience, broadening of the venue provisions of Title 28 to permit these actions to
be brought locally is desirable from the standpoint of efficient
judicial administration. Frequently, these proceedings involve
problems which are recurrent but peculiar to certain areas, such
as water rights, grazing land permits, and mineral rights. These
are problems with which judges in those areas are familiar and
which they can handle expeditiously and intelligently.
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as the Secretary can now be served outside the District of
Columbia for the price of a certified letter, the necessity of
determining whether the Secretary is in fact an indispensable
party has been eliminated."
C. Unavailability of Mandamus Outside
The District of Columbia
In 1813, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the Federal district courts did not have jurisdiction to issue
original writs of mandamus." However, in 1838, the Court
ruled that the District of Columbia Circuit Court, as the
inheritor of the common law juris'diction of the Maryland
courts, had jurisdiction to issue original writs of mandamus.82
This law remained the same until 1962, and it has been
settled law that the district courts outside the District of
Columbia could issue writs of mandamus only ancillary to
their original jurisdiction and had no jurisdiction to issue
original writs of mandamus. The result has been that lower
courts have ruled that they are without jurisdiction in cases
seeking relief "in the nature of mandamus.""3
However, in 1962, this rather curious anomaly of the
law of Federal jurisdiction was eliminated. In that year,
Congress passed Public Law 87-748, which provides: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action
in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff."34 This amendment has greatly simplified the problems faced by a party who seeks to compel
an officer to perform a 'dutyowed to him, as it is no longer
necessary to travel to the District of Columbia in order to
30. Of course, the amendment to the venue statute does not eliminate the doctrine of the indispensable superior officer. Accordingly, if under the prior
law the case is one in which the Secretary would not be an indispensable
party, care must be taken to insure that the local official whose action or

nonaction is complained of is joined as a party defendant in the proceeding
for review. It would seem that in most instances any difficulties could be
avoided simply by bringing suit against both the local official whose actions
are complained of and against the Secretary.
31. M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 504 (1813). See also Knapp v.
Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 197 U.S. 536 (1905).
32. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
83. See, e.g., Palmer v. Walsh, 78 F. Supp. 64 (D. Ore. 1948); Marshall v.
Crotty, 185 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1950). See also DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT § 23.10 (1959).

84. 76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964).
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obtain the relief sought. However, the amendment does not
solve all the problems surrounding judicial review of administrative decisions under the Mineral Leasing Act. It has
been held that the statute does not impliedly waive the sovereign immunity of the United States, 5 and, as will be seen,
it has no effect upon the rather limited scope of review
available under the mandamus remedy.
PART II
THE ACTION FOR REVIEW

Assuming that a party has been aggrieved by a decision
of an officer of the Bureau of Land Management under the
Mineral Leasing Act, and that the party has appealed that
decision to the Director of the Bureau of Land Management
and to the Secretary of the Interior only to see the decision
affirmed, the case is ripe for the filing of a proceeding in
the Federal district court to review the administrative action
complained of.
As with any other lawsuit, the first thing to be determined
is the time within which the action must be brought. The
only applicable statute of limitation states: "No action contesting a decision of the Secretary involving any oil and gas
lease shall be maintained unless such action is commenced
or taken within ninety days after the final decision of the
Secretary relative to such matter.'"
The next question the party seeking review must consider is the form in which the action should be brought. The
Administrative Procedure Act" provides that, in the absence
of a special statutory review proceeding, the form of the
proceeding for review shall be "any applicable form of legal
action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs
of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in
any court of competent jurisdiction.""s It has long been
35. Smith v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 402 (D. Wyo. 1963), af 'd, 333 F.2d
70 (10th Cir. 1964).
36. 74 Stat. 790 (1960), 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1964). See ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 28.12 n.11-12
(1964), citing Tallman v. Udall, 324 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), as holding
that a petition for rehearing before the Secretary tolls the 90-day limitation period, which begins to run anew after the petition has been acted
upon, provided the petition is considered on its merits.
37. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1964).
88. Ibid.
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135

recognized that the Federal courts are open to actions seeking
an injunction or mandamus"0 to correct abuses of administrative action, even in the absence of a specific or general statute
Although a distinction is
authorizing such proceedings."
sometimes drawn between an action for review under section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and a "nonstatutory"
action seeking review by the historical writs of mandamus
and injunction,4 ' the only practical distinction for the purposes of reviewing administrative action under the Mineral
Leasing Act is between a suit for a writ of mandamus (because
of historical limitations on the availability of the writ) and a
suit for review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Traditionally, the writ of mandamus is not available to control the exercise of discretion," whereas section 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes review of an
action involving discretion so long as the action is not committed to discretion. 3 Furthermore, since section 10 of the
Administrative Procedure Act authorizes suits for "prohibitory or mandatory injunction" and for declaratory judgment, and since the scope of review is governed by section 10
in any action to which it applies,'4 it is clear that no practical
purpose is served by differentiating between a suit for declaratory judgment or injunction on the one hand and a suit for
review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
on the other. Thus, for the purposes of this discussion, it will
39. Note, however, that prior to 1962, an action "in the nature of mandamus"
could be brought only in the District of Columbia. See notes 31-33 supra
and accompanying text.
40. See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review:
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARv. L. REv.
1479, 1480-82 (1962).
41. See Byse, supra note 40, at 1480 n.3, 1481 n.5; ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL
LAW FOUNDATION, FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 28.12 at 888 (1964):
Review of Secretarial action . . . [takes] the form . . . of
an original action against the Secretary of the Interior in a United
States District Court, either in the form of mandamus, injunction,
declaratory judgment, or review under section 10 of the APA.
42. See United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316
(1903); Seebach v. Cullen, 224 F. Supp. 15 (N.D. Cal. 1963), aff'd, 338
F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 972 (1965).
43. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
44. It is generally recognized that the scope of review of administrative action

is governed by § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act unless the case
falls within the stated exception precluding review where (1) a statute
precludes review or (2) agency action is committed to the agency's or
official's discretion. 60 Stat. 243, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). As pointed out
by Professor Davis, review was held precluded in these two situations prior
to the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act therefore left unchanged the prior law of review-
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be assumed that an action for relief will take the form of
either (1) an application for an original writ of mandamus,
or (2) a suit for review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
A. Mandamus
The writ of mandamus is a proper remedy when the party
feeling himself aggrieved by a decision of the Secretary or
his delegate under the Mineral Leasing Act seeks only to
compel the exercise of some ministerial function. Because
of the strict application of the historical rule that the writ
is not available to control the exercise of administrative discretion,45 it will be seen that the mandamus remedy is of
limited usefulness in reviewing actions of the Secretary or
his delegate under the Mineral Leasing Act.
1. Jurisdiction
By legislation enacted in 1962 and previously discussed,"
Congress has provided that "the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus
to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 4
It has been held that the statute does not enlarge the scope
of available mandamus relief,48 and creates no new liabilities
or causes of actions." The statute does not constitute an imability. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 28.08 (1959). See also United
States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316 (1903). And, the
"substantial evidence" test of § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act
merely restated that rule as previously developed by the federal courts in
reviewing the evidence upon which administrative action was based. See
DAVIS, op. cit. supra at § 29.01. It appears, then, that except for the special
rules applicable to mandamus actions, the reviewability of the agency action
and the scope of review will in fact be governed by § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, regardless of the form in which the action is brought.
Accordingly, there should be no need for stating that there are four
forms of review available: The historical Writ of Mandamus, the historical
Writ of Injunction, an action for Declaratory Judgment, and an action for
review under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See RocKY
MOUNTAIN

45.
46.
47.
48.

49.

MINERAL

LAW FOUNDATION,

FEDERAL

OIL AND

GAS

LEASES

§ 28.12 at 894 (1964), suggesting these four remedies and advising the
parties seeking review to "invoke all applicable methods in his complaint."
See note 42 supra.
See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1964).
Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70 (10th Cir. 1964); Application of James,
241 F. Supp. 858 (S.D. N.Y. 1965). See Jacoby, The Effect of Recent
Changes in the Law of "Non-statutory" Judicial Review, 53 GEO. L.J. 19
(1964).
White v. Administrator of General Services Administration, 343 F.2d 444
(Sth Cir. 1965); Dover Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Jones, 227 F. Supp. 88 (D.
N.H. 1968).
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plied waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States
in mandamus actions,5 ° and removes no existing statutory
bars to such an action other than those of a geographical
nature."
2. Parties
By definition, mandamus is available only to compel
the performance of a ministerial act, and in most situations
where the remedy is available the actual performance of the
act sought will be 'done by a local official rather than by the
Director of the Bureau of Land Management or the Secretary
of the Interior. Thus, in most cases, the local official, whose
duty it is to perform the act sought, should probably be joined
as a party defendant. However, the doctrine of the indispensable superior officer as laid down in Williams v. Fanning,5 2
stated that "the superior officer is an indispensable party
if the decree granting relief sought will require him to take
action, either by exercising directly a power lodged in him
or by having a subordinate exercise it for him."" Since the
action taken by the local official is in most instances taken
by him as a delegate of the Secretary, who is entrusted under
the Mineral Leasing Act with performing the act, the doctrine
of the Williams case would seem to require that the Secretary
be joined in the action seeking mandamus.
3. Venue and Service of Process
Since 1962, the problem of deciding whether the Secretary of the Interior is an indispensable party and attempting
to discover some means of suing the Secretary for mandamus
relief outside the District of Columbia has been eliminated.
In fact, insofar as actions for an original writ of mandamus
are concerned, prior to 1962 courts outside the District of
Columbia were not only improper forums from the standpoint
of venue and personal jurisdiction over the Secretary (in that
the Secretary could be served only in the District of Columbia), but such courts also lacked jurisdiction to issue original
50. Smith v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 402 (D. Wyo. 1963), aff'd, 333 F.2d
70 (10th Cir. 1964); Rose v. MeNamara, 225 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
51. Sprague Elec. Co. v. Tax Court of United States, 230 F. Supp. 779 (D.
Mass. 1964), ajf'd, 340 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1965).
52. 332 U.S. 490 (1947). See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 493.
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mandamus relief." As part of the same Act 5 which broadened
the jurisdiction of the district courts over actions in the
nature of mandamus, Congress also passed the venue statute
which has previously been 'discussed 6 and which provides
that the action may be brought in any judicial district in
which a defendant in the action resides, the cause of action
arose, any real property involved in the action is situated,
or the plaintiff resides if no real property is so involved."
The summons and complaint are served as in other actions,
except that service upon an officer or agency outside the
district in which the suit is brought may be made by certified
mail.5"
4. Scope of Relief
As stated above, the scope of relief available in an action
for a writ of mandamus under Section 1361 is governed by
the prior law. 9 The classic statement of the scope of manda- °
mus relief is found in Wilbur v. United States ex rel Kadrie:
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being
its chief use. It also is employed to compel an action,
when refused, in matters involving judgment and
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
or 'discretion in a particular way nor to direct the
retraction or reversal of action already taken in the
exercise of either.
....

Where the duty in a particular situation is so

plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and equivalent to a positive command it is regarded as being
so far ministerial that its performance may be
compelled by mandamus, unless there be provision
or implication to the contrary. But where the duty
is not thus plainly prescribed but depends upon a
statute or statutes the construction or application
of which is not free from doubt, it is regarded as
involving the character of judgment or discretion
which cannot be controlled by mandamus.61
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
Act of Oct. 5, 1962, 76 Stat. 744 (1962).
See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964).
Ibid.
See note 48 supra.
281 U.S. 206 (1930).
Id. at 218-19 (Court's footnotes omitted).
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Mandamus will lie when the desired action of the officer
involves a duty plainly prescribed, but not when the desired
actions require acts of examination or consideration. 2 With
respect to the interpretation of statutory provisions, mandamus will not lie if the court finds that there is room for
'doubt as to what the statute means." Mandamus is not proper if there is an adequate remedy at law, including a suit
for monetary damages."4 As in other actions to review administrative decisions, the plaintiff must have exhausted his
administrative remedies.65
An example of the type of situation arising under the
Mineral Leasing Act in which mandamus would appear to
be the proper remedy because of the ministerial character of
the action involved would be refusal of the Secretary, after
having declared certain lands available for leasing, to issue
the lease to the highest responsible qualified bidder in the
case of competitive bidding' 6 or the first qualified person
making application to lease lands not within any known geological structure of a producing oil or gas field."7
B. Review Under Section 10 of
Administrative Procedure Act
If the action complained of involves the exercise of discretion or the interpretation of a statute the meaning of
which is not free from doubt so that mandamus is not available as a remedy, the alternative procedure is a suit for a
review of the administrative determination pursuant to section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.68 Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, review of administrative determinations is available by means of "any applicable form
62.
63.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 225 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. N.C. 1964), afI'd,
337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206 (1930); Work v. United
States ex rel. Dives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925); Roberts v. United States, 176
U.S. 221 (1900); Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 225 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. N.C.
1964), aff'd, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
United States ex rel. Girard Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540 (1937); United
States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954). See Jacoby, supra
note 48 at 26 n.41, discussing the continued applicability of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies to suits brought under § 1361.
See 74 Stat. 781 (1960), 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (1964).
See 74 Stat. 781 (1960), 30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1964) ; McKay v. Wahlenmaier,
226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
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of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments
or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction 69 "except so far
as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action
is by law committed to agency 'discretion."" Just as there
is no provision in the Mineral Leasing Act providing for review of administrative actions taken under the Act, there
is no provision specifically precluding judicial review. Consequently, the first exception to the actions which are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, namely, that
which applies where statutes preclude judicial review, has
no application insofar as judicial review of administrative
'determinations under the Mineral Leasing Act is concerned. 1
The second exception to the reviewability of administrative
decisions is that which arises when the agency action is" committed" to agency discretion. Inasmuch as "almost every
agency action involves some degree of discretion or judgment," the fact that discretion may be involved in the action
does not preclude review as long as the action is not committed
to discretion. 2 In reality, then, there are three levels of
administrative discretion which must be considered in seeking
review of an administrative determination. The first, where
the action involves no judgment or discretion and does not
involve the interpretation of an ambiguous statute, presents
a situation in which the remedy of mandamus is proper. The
second, in which the action involves the exercise of some
discretion or the interpretation of a statute the meaning of
which is not free from doubt, is subject to review under the
provisions of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
In the third situation, in which the action is committed by
law to agency discretion, no review is available. On this third
level, it has been held that the question of whether oil and
gas leases or prospecting permits should be issued with re69. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1964).
70. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
71. In order for review to be precluded by statute within the meaning of § 10
of the Administrative Procedure Act, the statute must expressly preclude
review or give "clear and convincing evidence" upon its face of any intention to withhold review and a mere failure to provide for review is not
evidence of such intention. See Legislative History of The Administrative
Procedure Act, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 275 (1946).
72. Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964); Homovich v. Chapman, 191
F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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spect to particular tracts of land is by law committed to the

discretion of the Secretary of the Interior and hence is unreviewable by the courts."
An exhaustive review of the types of situations in which
it could be said that the agency action (1) involved no discretion or interpretation, (2) involved discretion or interpretation, or (3) was committed to discretion is beyond the
scope of this article. In doubtful cases, of course, it is assumed
that the positive approach will be taken and that the matter
will be presented to the court at least by the plaintiff's counsel
as involving no discretion or merely involving, as distinct
from being committed to, discretion. For the purposes of this
discussion, then, let us assume that it can be determined that
the agency action complained of or wrongfully withheld simply involves an exercise of discretion or the interpretation of
an ambiguous statute, in which case review is not precluded
unrder the Administrative Procedure Act.
1. Jurisdiction
As stated above, the provisions of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act which provide that "any person
suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof,"74 have been construed by recent decisions as waiving
the defense of sovereign immunity and granting jurisdiction
to the district courts for a review of administrative decisions."
However, the party seeking review would be well advised to
plead, as additional bases for Federal jurisdiction, an approaddition to
priate section of Title 28, United States Code, in
76
Act.
Procedure
Administrative
the
of
section 10
See Peck, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions of Bureau of Land
Management and Secretary of Interior, 9 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 225,
240 n.51 (1964).
74. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
75. See note 20 supra.
76. Professor Byse, writing in 1962, before the enactment of the new § 1361
granting mandamus jurisdiction to courts outside the District of Columbia,
stated the following:
If Section 1361 becomes law, it is likely that careful counsel
seeking 'non statutory' judicial review will ground his action on
(1) an appropriate jurisdictional section of chapter 85, title 28,
United States Code, (2) sections 2201 and 2202 of title 28-the
Declaratory Judgments Act, (3) section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958), and
(4) section 1361. It is likely also that unless government counsel
73.
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2. Parties
In general, the action for review will seek some specific
relief, such as the compelling of agency action which should
be taken or the setting aside of some agency action which has
been taken. For the most part, the actual performance or
nonperformance of the Act in its physical sense will rest with
the local land office official. However, the local official in
almost all instances is merely acting as a delegate of the
Secretary and, under the test in Williams v. Fanning,7 there
is a distinct possibility that the Secretary would be held to
be an indispensable party. Accordingly, as is the case when
relief in the nature of mandamus is sought, the safest way
to proceed is to name both the local land office official and
the Secretary of the Interior as defendants in the action.
effectively challenges the applicability of one or more of those
provisions, the district court will not draw nice distinctions concerning its scope of review. But if government counsel can show
that the court's jurisdiction rests on section 1361, the ministerialdiscretionary distinction and other technicalities of mandamus
law might become determinative.
Byse, supra note 40, at 1517 n.125. The only appropriate sections of Chapter
85, Title 28, United States Code, upon which jurisdiction could be grounded
in an action to review an administrative decision under the Mineral Leasing
Act would be either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964):
[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States ....
or 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states
or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
It is doubtful that the majority of cases in which review is sought under
the Mineral Leasing Act would involve, for example, an oil and gas lease
the value of which exceeded $10,000. And, while the action for declaratory
judgment is certainly a useful vehicle, especially when combined with a
prayer for other relief, relief against the Secretary's decision would be a
hollow thing indeed if the party seeking review could obtain only a declaration of his rights without any possibility of carrying them into effect.
Furthermore, the authority of a district court to entertain a suit under
the Declaratory Judment Act is limited by the language of the Act to "a
case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction .... ." 62 Stat. 964 (1948),
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, it has been
held that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not of itself create jurisdiction, but merely adds an additional remedy where the district court
already has jurisdiction to entertain a suit. Wells v. United States, 280
F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1960). The conclusion then, is that if it is impossible
to allege in good faith that the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of
$10,000, the only jurisdictional bases for a suit for review of an administrative decision under the Mineral Leasing Act are either (1) the Mandamus
Statute-28 U.S.C. § 1361; or (2) § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
77. 332 U.S. 490 (1947). See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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The venue statute enacted in 19627" allows the action for
a review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act to be brought in a district in which a defendant in the
action resides, the cause of action arose, any real property
involved in the action is situated, or the plaintiff resides if
no real property is so involved.7 9 Service of the summons
and complaint outside the district may be made by certified
mail."°
At this point it might be advisable to insert a word of
caution. The venue statute"1 speaks of a civil action in which
each defendant "is an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity
or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United
States .... ,," This language would seem to contemplate the
filing of actions for review against the agency itself, which
would mean the filing of an action for review against the
Department of the Interior or the Bureau of Land Management. While perhaps no real problem would be presented,
and while the authors speak with an abundance of caution,
it is recommended that at least until further relaxation of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the action for review be
brought against the individual officials involved rather than
against the Department or agency. Even though the law
defining the jurisdiction of the court to hear the suit should
be the same in either instance, bringing the suit against the
Department or the bureau seems simply to invite the government to raise the defense of sovereign immunity.
3. Scope of Review
Section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act defines the scope of review and the relief which may be granted
under the Act as follows:
(e) So far as necessary to decision and where
presented the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
78. 76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964).
accompanying text.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid. (Emphasis added).
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applicability of the terms of any agency action. It
shall (A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure
required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence in any case subject to the requirements of
sections 1006 and 1007 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided
by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the
extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by
the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall review the whole record or
such portions thereof as may be cited by any party,
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error."
Space does not permit an examination of these rather
comprehensive rules of review in their application to specific
issues. However, some general statements regarding the scope
of review are included herein simply to serve as a broad
outline.
Questions of law. When the facts upon which the administrative determination was based are not in dispute,
and the only question to be decided is the correctness of
the Secretary's interpretation of an applicable section of
the Mineral Leasing Act itself, the courts will not hesitate
to review the Secretary's interpretation to determine if it
accords with the language of the statute and the purpose of
the statute, gleaned primarily from its legislative history.8"
83. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964).
84. See Pruitt v. Flemming, 182 F. Supp. 159 (S.D. W.V. 1960); Seaton v. Texas
Co., 256 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Land 0' Lakes Creameries, Inc. v.
Commodity Credit Corp., 265 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1959); West v. United
States ex rel. Aling, 30 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1929); California Oil Co. v.
Udall, U.S.D.C., Dist. of N.Mex. No.5729 Civil, Jan. 15, 1965, holding that
the Secretary of the Interior could not interpret "actual drilling operations"
in 30 U.S.C. § 226-1(d) to mean "drilling must be continued in such a way
as to be an effort which one seriously looking for oil and gas could be
expected to make in that particular area, given existing knowledge of
geological and other factors normally considered when drilling for oil and
gas."
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However, since the Secretary is charged with the administration of the statutes, his construction is entitled to great
weight and is not normally overturned unless a different
construction is plainly required.8 5
With respect to review of an administrative decision
involving the interpretation of a regulation enacted pursuant
to and not in conflict with valid statutory authority, it is
more 'difficult to overturn the administrative determination.
In that situation, the agency's interpretation of its regulation
normally governs unless such interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" or is so unreasonable or unnatural as to "ensnare and entrap those governed
by it.""7 However, the Secretary will not be permitted to
make exceptions to his own regulation 8 nor will the courts
permit inconsistency in the Secretary's interpretation of a
statute or regulation."
Questions of fact. Section 10(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act provides in pertinent part:
So far as necessary to decision and where presented
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any agency action. It shall...
(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... (5) unsupported
by substantial evidence in any case subject to the
requirements of sections 1006 and 1007 of this title
or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court ......
Except for the provision in the Mineral Leasing Act
providing that the Secretary may himself bring an action
85. See United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183 (1930); Fawcus Machine Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931); United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350
U.S. 383 (1956).
86. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
87. Western Union Tel. Co. v. United States, 217 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1954).
88. See McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
89. See United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383 (1956); Clemons v. United
States, 245 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1957) ; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
United States, 209 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
90. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964).
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in the district court to cancel an oil and gas lease, 9 ' there is
no provision in the Mineral Leasing Act providing for a
hearing at which evidence can be introduced and witnesses
cross-examined prior to the taking of administrative action.
Hence, the "substantial evidence" test provided in section
10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements with respect to administrative hearings,"2 by their literal terms, are not applicable to hearings under the Mineral Leasing Act nor to
actions for a review of determinations based upon factual
matters.
However, the Department itself has recognized that the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act govern hearings on the validity of mining claims, even though no statutory
requirement for a hearing existed, for the reason that an
unpatented mining claim was a valuable property right protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."3
Indeed, it can be argued that the Department should be
required to furnish a "trial-type hearing" subject to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in any
case where a property right is adjudicated. 4 That question
is, however, beyond the scope of this article; and its relevance
for our purposes lies only in the fact that, where a hearing
subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act is afforded, or where a discretionary hearing is held
before a Field Commissioner,"5 the review of the agency action
as pertains to questions of fact will be governed by the substantial evidence and "whole record" test of section 10(e)
of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Even where the aggrieved party is afforded no opportunity for a formal hearing, the court in examining the
administrative determinations of fact will restrict itself to
the administrative record and will not hear the facts de novo"
30 U.S.C. § 188 (1964). See Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472 (1963), holding
that the section did not prevent administrative cancellation of an oil and gas
lease based on "pre-lease" factors.
92. 60 Stat. 241, 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006-07 (1964).
93. United States v. O'Leary, 63 Interior Dec. 341 (1956). See also Adams v.
Witmer, 271. F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958).
94. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, FEDERAL OIL AND GAS
LEASES § 28.11 (1964).
95. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 1851.1 -.9 (1965).
96. See Noren v. Beck, 199 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
91.
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The leading case defining "substantial evidence" as that
term is used in the Administrative Procedure Act is Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB. The Court, quoting from
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,97 said:
Accordingly, it "must do more than create a suspicion
of the existence of the fact to be established. ... it
must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury,
a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion
to be drawn from it is one of fact for the
sought
''
jury. 98

The "whole record" test means that: "The substantiality
of evidence must take into account whatever in the record
fairly detracts from its weight." 9 Thus, it is seen that the
rules governing the scope of review of evidence in an action
to review an administrative examination of the Mineral Leasing Act are similar to the familiar rules relating to the substantiality of evidence to support a jury verdict. It goes
without saying that the scope of review of the facts, thus
'defined, is restrictive, and this fact should be taken into
account when determining whether an action to review the
administrative decision should be brought in the first instance.
Review of discretion. As stated above, the Administrative
Procedure Act does not prevent the review of agency action
which merely involves the exercise of discretion, as long as
the action is not "committed" to discretion. 0 0 Section 10(e)
of the Administrative Procedure Act declares that the court
shall set aside agency action which is found to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... "I"' Thus, even though the action complained of involves the exercise of discretion, it can be set
aside if it is found to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse
of discretion." 2 The decisions allowing review of administrative action involving discretion for the purpose of determining whether the action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
Id. at 488.
See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964).
See Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958); Homovich v. Chapman,
191 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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of discretion, in excess of statutory authority, or based upon
findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence, effectuate the purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act. It
is to be hoped that the attitude expressed in early decisions
involving the Secretary of the Interior, which held that a
determination of fact by the Secretary is conclusive in the
absence of fraud or imposition," 3 and that the exercise of his
discretion could not be controlled," 4 belongs entirely to the
past.
CONCLUSION

No provision for judicial review is found within the
Mineral Leasing Act. Therefore, review of administrative
decisions under that Act must be obtained by suit against
the Secretary in a federal district court, seeking either mandamus relief if the action sought to be compelled can be classed
as "ministerial" or review under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act in other cases. Since the determination
of what actions are ministerial and what are discretionary
is seldom free from doubt, the safest procedure would be to
file an action seeking both mandamus relief and relief under
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging any
other bases of Federal jurisdiction which may be appropriate.
Recent amendments to Title 28 of United States Code have
greatly expanded the availability of both forms of review,
and have removed many bars to judicial review which formerly existed by virtue of the 'doctrines of the indispensable
superior official and unavailability of mandamus relief outside the District of Columbia. The doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to present a problem in judicial review of
administrative actions, but careful pleading and attention to
the basis upon which review is sought should avoid application of the doctrine.

103.
104.

See e.g., Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
See United States ex rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcoek, 190 U.S. 316 (1903).
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